In this article I analyze the effects of a recent reform intended to decrease switching costs in the cellular industry. The reform, implemented in Chile in 2012, allowed cell phone users to switch operators without any contract restriction while keeping their wireless number. Its aim was the belief that lower switching costs would force incumbent companies to charge lower prices by introducing more competition among them. I test the empirical implications of models of switching costs using individual data on customers' bills and plans. I find that average price decreased by 7.2 percent. Moreover, my results provide evidence that the operators reacted primarily by decreasing the price of on-net plans and by offering handsets with data connectivity at a discounted rate. I also find a decrease in the introductory price discounts that operators offer to new customers. I interpret this result as due to the lower ability of the firms to lock-in customers.
1 to a different operator. Number portability reduces, therefore, the ability of operators to lock-in customers. Policy-makers believe that lower switching costs will force incumbent companies to charge lower prices by introducing more competition among them and by lifting barriers to entry to new operators.
In this article, I analyze the effects of a recent reform that allowed number portability in the cellular industry in Chile in January 2012. This policy also made it possible for customers to cancel their contract at any given time, by forbidding contract restrictions that oblige customers to remain in the operator.
The reform of number portability thus provides a regulatory change that allows me to test empirically models of switching costs (e.g Klemperer, 1987b ). These models predict that firms will play a bargain-then-ripoff strategy in equilibrium, thus offering low prices to new customers and charging high prices to current customers that will continue buying from the firm because of switching costs. A decrease in switching costs reduces the firms' ability to harvest locked-in customers and accordingly lowers the price charged to current customers. However, following a backward-induction type of reasoning, lower switching costs also reduce competition to attract new customers and therefore they are charged a higher price than before.
The impact on average price is thus unclear because of the conflicting direction of the two effects. Recent literature (for example Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi, 2009; and Cabral, 2013) suggests against conventional wisdom that small switching costs may have a negative effect on average prices.
Consequently, I estimate the effect of lower switching costs on average price using individual data given to me by one of the largest wireless operators. I examine how this effect varies over the different wireless service plans offered. I also test if lower switching costs have reduced price discounts to new customers, as predicted by the theory. My empirical strategy consists of regressing the monthly bill of customers on a dummy variable that indicates whether there was portability at the time, while controlling for various plan characteristics. An interaction term between the portability dummy and the plan characteristics provides the change in the degree of curvature of the nonlinear pricing schedule. In order to test for the change of price of new customers, I compare the price they pay before and after number portability controlling for the plan they choose. Individual data allow me to control for unobserved consumer characteristics.
My results show that number portability lowered average price by 7.2 percent and that the effect largely differed over types of plans. The strongest negative effect was for voice-only and on-net plans. These findings suggest two ways the operator responded to number portability. First, it reduced the price of on-net plans. Second, the higher price of data plans after number portability may indicate that the operator sold handsets with data connectivity at a discounted rate. The operator recovered then the discount by charging a higher fee for plans with data connection.
Furthermore, the price charged to new customers increased, as robustly predicted by the theory. I interpret this result as a decrease in introductory price discounts that operators can offer to new customers due to locked-in customers. Therefore, I find evidence that the reform diminished the ability of the operators to price discriminate between new and current customers. I also find a decrease in price paid by customers who switched to a different plan within the operator. Customers who switch plans may have lower switching costs, for example, because they pay the costs of the involved hassle of asking for a change of plan or because they asked to cancel their contract but remained in the operator after getting a better price. Number portability increases, in this way, the price discount they get for not switching operator.
This article contributes to the empirical literature on switching costs. The theoretical literature on switching costs started with von Weizsacker (1984) and Klemperer (1987a Klemperer ( , 1987b ) and has had since several developments, such as extensions to dynamic infinite-period and multiple firms models. Chen (1997) The empirical evidence on models of switching costs is much more limited and tends to support the view that switching costs have anti-competitive effects.
Among other examples, Knittel (1997) studies switching costs in long-distance rates; Hartmann and Viard (2008) , in reward programs; and Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003), in bank accounts. Hannan and Adams (2011) also study bank accounts and find that banks in areas with more in-migration, and therefore with more potential new customers, offer a better price to customers. Particularly related to this article are Viard (2007) , who examines the 800-number portability and finds that prices for large customers decreased more than prices for small ones, although in a context where firms cannot price discriminate, and Park (2011) , who studies wireless num-3 ber portability in the US. 1 She finds using data from the operators' web sites that while average prices dropped by 0.97 percent, the price of large plans decreased by 6.81 percent. However, Park's analysis is restricted by data limitations. She uses data on plans characteristics and prices that operators posted on-line. Thus, the absence of information on customers forces her to give the same weight to all the observed plans regardless of the number of customers in each one. Her data do not allow considering plans that are no longer advertised, even if a large number of customers remain in them. Finally, she cannot refer to price discrimination between new and current customers. My data allow me to address these issues directly.
The Number Portability Reform
Competition in telecommunications is a major concern of regulatory agencies.
Specifically in the industry for wireless service, a widespread measure taken to increase competition has been number portability, which allows cell phone users to keep their phone number when switching to a different operator. Number portability reduces switching costs and thus the ability of operators to lock-in customers.
Behind this policy lies the belief that lower switching costs will force companies to charge lower prices by making easier for consumers to switch among operators.
The reform that allowed number portability in the cellular industry in Chile was introduced in January 2012. The objective that the government sought with the portability rule was to introduce more competition among incumbents and open the market to new entrants, especially to mobile virtual network operators (MVNO).
These do not own the infrastructure they use, but rent it from one of the network operators. While the effect of the number portability on prices in Chile is largely disputed, MVNOs' market share has not changed and remains lower than 2 percent. Before number portability, customers typically were bound to the operator by contract for 18 months. In order to cancel the contract, they were required to pay a fee. The reform of number portability made possible for customers the cancellation of their service contract at any given time and also required the operator to unlock the handset of a customer upon request. Nevertheless, contract restrictions still apply for handsets purchases. As a result, when a customer purchases a handset from the operator after the reform, she can switch operator at any time, but still has to pay the handset to the original operator. Cell phone payments are typically spread over 18 months.
The penetration rate of wireless phone service in Chile is roughly 135 percent. 3 As of December 2012, there were 6.8 million wireless contracts that correspond to 39.17 percent of the population. 
Data
The data I use consist of a panel dataset of all the contract customers of one of the two largest operators. The data were given to me by the operator under a confidentiality agreement. The time period of the dataset spans from May 2011
to January 2013. I restrict my sample to individual (as opposed to corporate)
customers that contracted at most one wireless line. The reason for this is that multiple-lines contracts (such as family plans) are priced in a different way and the billing data on these contracts do not correctly reflect the total amount paid by the customer. I also leave out of the analysis a certain type of plans that do not allow for overage fees because their plan characteristics are not available. 5 These plans are meant to attract prepaid phone users and to prepare them purchase contract plans.
The dataset contains individual monthly data on plan characteristics, phone Based on these variables, I define any-destination plans as those that include only any-destination minutes, while on-net plans also include minutes for on-net calls separately. Usually, on-net plans contain a large number of on-net minutes and relatively few any-destination minutes as can be seen in table 2. Data plans have an unlimited data allowance, but after reaching a certain threshold, the speed of the connection noticeably decreases.
Variables related to usage are outbound and inbound minutes, data connection usage, and total monthly bill. The latter corresponds to payments for wireless service. Therefore, fees related to handset purchases are not included. Customer related variables include a dummy that indicates whether the customer is an individual or a company, an identification number that enables matching a customer to the lines she contracted, the date when the customer arrived to the company, and if she arrived to the company using number portability. Finally, I have some demographic information on individuals, such as gender, age, and city of residence. Table 2 shows that after number portability average fixed prices and monthly bills increased, but also the total number of minutes included, especially the number of any-destination minutes included in any-destination plans.
Furthermore, data plans increased from 25 percent to 37 percent of the share of total plans. Finally, the customers that arrived to the company through number portability are a very small share of the total number of new customers. 7
Model and Empirical Strategy
In many markets, consumers have to pay a cost to switch to a different product or to buy from a different firm. This cost can take many forms, such as paying a fee In this article, I take to the data models of switching costs. These models do not offer an unequivocal prediction of the effect of a change in switching costs. Thus, the main focus of this paper is to analyze the effect of a decrease in switching costs in the case of the Chilean wireless industry.
Models of Switching Costs
My aim in this subsection is not to develop a model of switching costs, but to show the intuition of the forces that are at work in them. Consider a two-stage game such as Klemperer's (1987b) in which consumers have to decide in the first period whether to buy or not, and if so from which firm. In the second period, they again have to decide whether to buy or not, but if the consumer wants to buy from a different firm, she has to pay a switching cost. A number of models predict that firms will play a bargain-then-ripoff strategy in equilibrium, by which firms harvest locked-in customers by charging them a higher price than in the absence of switching costs.
On the other hand, higher profits from locked-in customers make firms compete more aggressively to attract new customers, investing in market share and charging a lower price to new customers.
A decrease in switching costs reduces the harvesting effect and thus the price charged to locked-in customers decreases. However, following a backward-induction type of reasoning, lower switching costs also reduce competition to attract new customers. The impact on average price is thus unclear because of the conflicting direction of the two effects. Actually, it depends on the model specifications, such as forward-looking or myopic customers, and product differentiation. Recent theoretical literature suggests that while large switching costs can lead to higher average prices, small switching costs can lead to lower, more competitive prices. 8 When firms can distinguish between new and existing customers, as is the case in the wireless service industry, they can price discriminate between them. 9 This can take the form , for example, of price discounts that apply only to new customers.
A decrease in switching costs, as mentioned earlier, will increase the price new customers pay. 11 In this section, by number portability I refer to the reform as it occurred in Chile, which included number portability per se and the cancellation of contract restrictions to switch operators. This is also the case for the rest of this article, unless I distinguish between them explicitly. better rate as part of customer retention programs. The monthly bill paid for service includes overage charges. However, since overage charges and separate calls on and off-net are not reported in the dataset, these cannot be inferred without making strong assumptions on the demand. 12 Customer fixed-effects, when included, capture unobserved customer heterogeneity, such as part of the overage charges of customers who regularly exceed their minutes allowance.
Cell phone companies generally have a large number of plans. Specifically in my data, there are thousands of plans as defined by a code identifier. 13 Besides, if the fixed price of a given plan changes, we will see it in the database as two different plans. Therefore, I do not condition directly the portability effect on the different plans, but I instead project the plans into a characteristics space. Hence, I define a plan by the features it offers, such as number of minutes included or availability of data connection.
The effect on average price and on the curvature of the price schedule
In order to find the effect of the portability reform on the customers actual payment and on the curvature of the price schedule, I estimate the equation
where ln(p ijt ) is log of the price paid by customer i for plan j at time t, ln(M inutes jt ) is the vector composed by the different types of minutes (on-net, any-destination) included in plan j at time t (plus one so that the logarithm of zero on-net minutes is defined for any-destination plans), and Γ jt is a vector of characteristics of plan j at 12 An alternative approach to which the results I present in section 5 are robust is to get a measure of individual overage charges. This can be done by multiplying the difference between minutes used and minutes included in the plan by the overage charge per minute (and if this figure is negative, overage charges are zero). Thus, one can get a measure of overage fees by assuming that the overage charge per minute is the same for all the customers. Yet, one further assumption on the proportion between on and off-net calls for customers with on-net plans is needed. A possibility is that the proportion between on and off-net calls (of a customer that contracted an on-net plan) is equal to the proportion between on and off-net minutes included in his or her plan. However, the median of this ratio for on-net plans is 95 percent of on-net minutes, which probably is not real. 13 However, the vast majority of customers concentrates in only a few hundred. Most plans are either tailored to particular customers or reflect a specific price discount.
time t that might have changed with number portability, such as possibility of data connection or whether the plan is an any-destination plan. P ortab t is a dummy that equals one if at time t number portability was in effect. Finally, X ijt is a vector of controls of customer i, plan j, and time t (such as a plan category dummy and a time trend); λ i is a fixed-effect for customer i, and ε ijt is measurement error. The latter includes unobserved plan features that affect the price of the plan, such as number of text messages included, and the overage fees not captured by the customer fixed effect. 14 The effect of number portability on price is obtained from the coefficients of equation (1) . Restricting the interaction coefficients with portability δ 1 and δ 2 to be zero, the average effect of number portability is δ 0 . If this restriction is lifted, one obtains the change in the degree of curvature of the nonlinear pricing schedule with respect to plan characteristics from the interaction term between the portability dummy and plan characteristics δ 1 and δ 2 respectively. These tell us how the effect of number portability varies over the size of plans, allowing us to know if large or small plans with respect to the number of minutes included changed the most after the reform. To be more explicit, to obtain for example the effect of portability on a plan that includes 100 minutes, one has to sum δ 1 and 100 * δ 2 . Therefore δ 2 tells us how the number of minutes included in the plan affects the effect of number portability.
The effect on price discounts
Wireless operators can condition price to the status of the consumer in the company.
I estimate a different effect of number portability for two types of customers. New customers and those who switched to a different plan within the operator. While the motivation for new customers is clear from the theoretical models, I also test the effect on customers switching plans because these may signal for lower switching costs. If this is the case, we would see that after the reform they pay lower prices than before. Therefore, I test for changes in price discounts to customers by estimating the equation (2) where N ew ijt and Switched ijt are dummy variables that indicates the customer status in the company. The variable N ew ijt equals one for the three months after a customer arrives to the operator and zero otherwise. Switched ijt equals one for the three months after a customer switches from a given plan to plan j and zero otherwise. 15 All the other variables are defined as in equation (1). Notice that if the model presented by equation (1) is correct, then the estimation of equation (2) is biased if the interaction terms between portability and plans characteristics are not included. Thus, I report the results of this specification as well.
The change in price discrimination is inferred from equation (2) . The estimated coefficients µ 1 and µ 2 do not provide causal information because the operator changes plans and price discounts endogenously and because customers self-select to plans. However, the introduction of number portability serves to identify the causality of the effect of lower switching costs on price discrimination. Hence, the effect on the price offered to new customers is obtained from θ 1 and the change in the price charged to current customers that switched to a different plan is θ 2 .
Results
In this section I report the results of the estimation of equations (1) and (2) . The dependent variable is the log of the monthly bill for wireless service. All of the various specifications include dummies for seven broad plan categories, which are defined by the operator. Four of these categories include data connection and the other three do not. Thus, when one of the regressors is the interaction term between number portability and data, the plan category dummies control for data connection plans.
Similarly, when I include an interaction term between portability and anydestination plans, I do not include an any-destination plan dummy because I control for the log on-net number of minutes in the plan that take the value of zero if the plan is any-destination. Implicitly, the restriction I am imposing in these specifications is that the effect of portability is the same for any number of minutes included in the plans in these categories (plans with data connection, any-destination plans). 16 Also, all the regressions include a linear time trend and the results are robust to using other polynomials. I cluster standard errors by customer to account for correlation at the customer level in the error terms.
Customer fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity in customer characteristics such as usage preferences or value of the customer for the firm, but making the assumption that these are constant over time. This advantage of fixed effects over a pooled regression makes the results with fixed effects my preferred specification. When the regression includes customer fixed-effects, the interpretation of the coefficients becomes the change on the mean price charged to each customer. Also, the identification of the coefficients of plan characteristics and their interactions comes only from customers that switched plans.
I report the results of the estimation of equation (1) (1) and (2) show the effect of number portability on average price when conditioning on plans size and availability of data connection. The effect on average price is negative and significant. Using customer fixed effects, I find that number portability lowered average price by 7.2 percent.
Column (3) of table 4 shows the results when the effect of portability is allowed to interact with plan characteristics. The results show that the effect of wireless portability largely differs over types of plans. The interactions of P ortability with Data and Any−Destination are positive, meaning that the strongest negative effect was for voice-only and on-net plans. These positive coefficients suggest that the operator responded to number portability in two ways. First, it reduced the price of on-net plans. Second, the higher price of data plans after number portability may indicate that the operator sold handsets with data connectivity at a discounted rate. 17 The operator then recovered the discount by charging a higher fee for data connection. This explains the increase in data plans after the reform. 18 16 I relax the restriction on any-destination plans in the results presented in table 5. 17 Industry insiders confirmed me that these two effects were actually the reaction of the industry to the portability regulation. The newspaper article cited in section 2 provides further evidence of this. 18 The data do not allow me to separate customers that purchased the handset from the operator from those who did not. Therefore, I cannot know for which of these customers the price of data plans increased. Standard errors clustered by customer in parentheses. All regressions include plan category dummies and a linear time trend. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Table 5 : The Effect of Portability on the Curvature of Price.
All Plans
On-Net Plans
Any-Destination Plans 
265,739
Standard errors clustered by customer in parentheses.
All regressions include plan category dummies and a linear time trend. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of equation (1) when the effect of number portability is allowed to interact with the number of minutes included.
This specification examines the change in the curvature after number portability.
This is important to know whether large or small size plans changed price the most after controlling for the number of minutes included. The results with consumer fixed effects of column (2) indicate that the price of plans with a larger number of on-net minutes decreased more, while plans with a larger number of any-destination minutes decreased less. However, the effect of number portability seems to have a very different impact on the number of any-destination and on-net minutes included and therefore I cannot provide a final answer. Also, the changing sign of P ortability Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of equation (2). Columns (3) and ( I also find a decrease in price paid by customers that switched to a different plan within the operator, as seen from the negative coefficient of Switched P lan * P ortab.
Customers that switch plans may have lower switching costs, for example, because they pay the costs of the involved hassle of asking for a change of plan or because they asked to cancel their contract but remained in the operator after getting a better price. Number portability increases the price discount they get for not switching operator. Furthermore, the positive effect of portability on price of data and any- 
Robustness
The effect on fixed price
The approach stated in section 4 estimates the effect of number portability on the total price paid by customers conditional on the characteristics of the chosen plan.
In this subsection I analyze the effect of portability on the plan fixed price. 
Conclusion
In this article I have analyzed the effects of a recent reform that decreased switching costs in the cellular industry. It allowed cell phone users to switch operator without any contract restriction while keeping their wireless number. This regulatory change 22 allowed me to test the empirical implications of theoretical models of switching costs.
These models predict that if consumers have to pay a cost to switch to a different company, firms will offer low prices to new customers and charge high prices to current customers that will continue buying from the firm because of the switching costs. Therefore, a decrease in switching costs reduces the firms' ability to harvest locked-in customers and thus lowers price charged to current customers. However, lower switching costs also reduce competition to attract new customers and therefore increase the price they pay.
I found that the portability reform decreased average price by 7.2 percent. My results suggest that the operator responded to number portability in two ways, reducing the price of on-net plans and selling handsets with data connectivity at a discounted rate. I also found that the price charged to new customers increased. I interpret this result as a decrease in introductory price discounts that operators can offer to new customers due to locked-in customers. Therefore, the reform diminished the ability of the operators to price discriminate between new and current customers.
This work can be extended in several directions. First, I have not referred to the effect of the expectations of the reform. This may have lowered the price even in the months preceding the actual introduction of portability. Second, I have not studied the difference in the characteristics of the customers that arrived to and left the operator before and after the reform. Finally, this paper has estimated the joint effects of number portability and the cancellation of contracts restrictions that the reform entailed. Disentangling them may have important policy implications to markets such as the US in which wireless number portability was already introduced, but significant contract restrictions still apply. To separate the two effects of the reform, a structural model is needed.
